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The book is a well-structured expedition into Russellian monism, with two 
main parts consisting of ten chapters (fi ve for each part). The chapters 
themselves are further divided, which gives the reader a welcomed over-
view of thought progression and structure. In the fi rst half, Goff develops 
a distinct version of physicalism and gives his critique of it. In the second 
half, he articulates different versions of Russellian monism and defends a 
particular version based on a panpsychist interpretation of Russellian mo-
nism. At the very start, he introduces the reader to his vision of philosophy 
and the overarching theme of the book. The reader is introduced to Goff’s 
starting thesis about the datum of consciousness, and Goff spends some 
time arguing for it and sketching the historical context that shows how 
and why this datum was ignored. However, because the plausibility and 
legitimacy of Russellian monist views hinge on this datum, it is necessary 
to understand the contemporary context in which the claim “consciousness 
is a datum” calls for a defence.
In contemporary philosophy of mind, the discussion regarding the mind-
body problem has been radicalized to the point where mainstream tradition-
al physicalism is losing its proponents. We see fewer philosophers who are 
ready to maintain a compatibilist position that mental, phenomenal states 
are real and can be placed within the physicalist ontology. Instead, we see a 
rise in radical ideas and positions, which, one could argue, is only more ben-
efi cial for the dialectics of the problem-solving. On one hand, we have the so-
called defl ationists, who realized that one cannot be a realist about mental 
states and at the same time hold that physicalism is true—therefore, their 
physicalist position has been radicalised to the point where they deny the 
reality of mental states. Illusionists, for example, maintain that phenom-
enal states are illusionary, that they are not in any way instantiated prop-
erties of any system, but that the appearance of phenomenality is somehow 
generated by our faulty introspective self-representational models. Their 
research focus is centred on cognitive mechanisms that give rise to these il-
lusions of phenomenality. On the other hand, we have realists about mental 
states, one could call them infl ationists, who maintain that the placement 
problem of mental states is indicative of their special nature, namely their 
non-physical nature. Since we cannot fathom how mental states (if real) can 
be placed within the physical framework, this means that the mental states 
must somehow be something extraphysical. In this sense, the peculiar epis-
372 Book Review
temic situation about consciousness is an opportunity to speculate about 
the suitable metaphysical framework that could accommodate the reality of 
phenomenal consciousness. Both camps have something in common, which 
is that they subscribe to the conservative methodology that understands 
theoretical revisions as justifi ed only when the existing theoretical resourc-
es have been exhausted. The mantra “fi rst exhaust then propose” sums up 
this approach. For example, current physicalist metaphysics should fi rst be 
exhausted, only then are we justifi ed in making certain metaphysical revi-
sions. However, the camps disagree at this point. Defl ationists think that 
the existing naturalistic framework has not been exhausted, since we can 
try to dissolve the problem of consciousness by replacing it with the illusion 
problem. Their answer to the hard problem is thus that the hard problem 
is not really a problem since its main component is an illusion. They choose 
the existing theory and proclaim the anomaly as an illusion. Infl ationists, on 
the other hand, are not committed to the existing naturalistic theories, and 
thus they see the anomaly as something real that could not in any way be an 
illusion. We are, after all, talking about consciousness, something that only 
a philosopher would dare to deny. For infl ationists, consciousness is a given 
fact and there is no way around this; thus, since we cannot place conscious-
ness in any physicalist ontology, we must make room in the ontology, we 
must modify it. Phillip Goff makes the case for this kind of modifi cation in 
his recent book Consciousness and Fundamental Reality (2017).
In the fi rst part of the book, Goff sets up pure physicalism (physical 
truths are entailed in logico-nomical terms) and addresses the main argu-
ments against it, like the conceivability and knowledge argument. These ar-
guments are usually employed by dualists and Goff recognizes that these 
arguments must be modifi ed in order to threaten physicalism. However, he 
puts forward an argument based on revelatory powers of phenomenal proper-
ties. This means that phenomenal conscious states reveal their nature to us 
by virtue of us experiencing them. I know what pain is just by virtue of me 
being in pain. I do not know what part of my brain is activated when I am 
having such experiences, but I do, nonetheless, know what these experiences 
are. This revelatory angle is tightly connected to the previously mentioned 
“consciousness as a datum” thesis that Goff introduces at the beginning of 
the fi rst chapter. Phenomenal states reveal to us something real, an aspect 
of a phenomenal subjective consciousness; moreover, this revelation produces 
something that is metaphysically unabridged and unrevised. As Goff writes: 
“My methodological starting point is that phenomenal consciousness is a hard 
datum that any adequate theory of reality must accommodate. Moreover, 
consciousness must be accommodated unrevised in the following sense” (3). 
His entire second part of the book and really any such metaphysical enquiry 
rests on similar propositions, and underlying it is a peculiar implication that 
“one of our ordinary pre-theoretical concepts gets the world exactly right” (3). 
Phenomenal experiences thus reveal something true about the world itself, at 
least in this sense that there is no reality/appearance distinction between our 
inner lives and the world itself. This is a striking claim that he is prepared 
to defend, even if it seems too good to be true, especially if we consider the 
fact that in the other camp the defl ationists have the opposite implication 
to defend, namely, the proposition that the reality/appearance distinction is 
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present at the level of introspection. This is the best illustration of the current 
dialectic about the problem of consciousness—the disagreement occurs at the 
very beginning. Thus, for someone who has a defl ationist inclination, Goff’s 
starting point is moot. The same goes for infl ationists; they consider any revi-
sion of the concept of consciousness to be unjustifi ed. It seems important that 
the reader holds this dialectical context in mind when reading this book, the 
discursive stalemate is indicative of the vast chasm between the two contem-
porary approaches to the problem of consciousness.
Embedding the revelation argument into the overarching datum of con-
sciousness thesis gives physicalists little room to manoeuvre and prepares 
the stage for the second part of the book, in which Goff explores theories 
based on Russellian monism. In brief, Russellian monism is the view that 
there is a distinction between two classes of properties, dispositional/struc-
tural ones and intrinsic ones. Sciences reveal structural properties about 
matter, yet they remain silent about its intrinsic nature. Considering we 
have at least one good idea about the intrinsic nature of matter (inner expe-
riences of our brains) and if we think that there should be a continuity be-
tween large and small parts of the world, we can then posit that the intrinsic 
nature of matter is something akin to consciousness. This is the simple path 
to panpsychist considerations, and Goff is most sympathetic towards them.
Even if we grant that Goff has good enough reasons to reject physicalism, 
there are other problems ahead for the positions that he proposes in part 
two. One of the fi rst reactions that panpsychists face is that of disbelief, be-
cause it just seems so unbelievable that the fundamental particles of matter 
are conscious in any way. The reluctance to accept this kind of reality might 
be mitigated by the theoretical benefi ts of these theories, or so Goff and 
other acolytes of Russellian monism claim when they defend their position 
against the objection of counter-intuitiveness—the same objection that they 
are also quite eager to throw at the physicalists who proclaim that there are 
no phenomenal properties.
Another, more serious and famous problem is the combination problem, 
or the subject-summing problem, as Goff calls it. He devotes up to three chap-
ters to this problem, its variables, and possible solutions. This seems reason-
able, as it is, after all, the central problem facing panpsychist theories. The 
problem is quite simple, and it entails our confusion when we are “trying to 
make sense of lots of ‘little’ (proto) minds forming a big mind” (165).
In developing all the viable responses to the problem, he makes a dis-
tinction between cosmo(macro)psychist and micropsychist versions of Rus-
sellian monism. The latter is a ‘smallist’ version that entails sub-atomic or 
other small regions of reality to be the (micro) subjects that have phenom-
enal properties. The former is the version about the whole cosmos having 
phenomenal properties. Continuing from this distinction, he makes an ob-
servation that the combination problem is a problem only for the micropsy-
chist versions. At this point, Goff has in mind a special version of the com-
bination problem, namely the subject irreducibility problem, which states 
that a conscious subject cannot be further analysed into facts that do not 
involve that subject.
To see how a cosmopsychist can avoid the subject irreducibility prob-
lem, we must make a distinction between analysis and subsumption. Goff 
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makes this distinction and argues that ‘grounding by analysis’ is different 
from ‘grounding by subsumption’. He introduces the notion of grounding by 
subsumption in Chapter 9, where he also articulates his view of cosmopsy-
chism. The main difference is that in grounding by analysis, y entails the 
necessary requirements for x to be real; and in grounding by subsumption, 
y is thought of as whole of which x is merely an aspect. This distinction en-
tails that a state of affair can occur in which y and x are real even if x is not 
grounded in y by analysis, as x can still be grounded in y by subsumption. 
He makes an effort in Chapter 9 to explain subsumption with four exam-
ples, but the important thing is that his argument for cosmopsychism rests 
on the importance of this distinction and on the theoretical fruitfulness of 
introducing the notion of grounding by subsumption. Goff goes on and ar-
ticulates his version of Russellian monism, the constitutive cosmopsychism 
according to which the cosmos as a whole can be understood as a conscious 
entity and that we are conscious subjects by virtue of being subsumed in 
this greater whole. He goes on and links cosmopsychism to priority monism, 
according to which the cosmos is the only fundamental entity, explaining 
how such a view does not exclude material reality and is as such coherent 
with empirical sciences.
The book ends with the chapter on the possibility of analytic metaphys-
ics or a manifesto, which is echoed in the title of the chapter. It is a suitable 
end to the metaphysically ambitious book. In this chapter, Goff discusses the 
state of cutting-edge metaphysics, he addresses some anti-metaphysical sen-
timents, and shows how phenomenality can be used to support metaphysical 
positions outside the mind-body problem. The broader picture he paints is 
that of analytic phenomenology: “Start with common sense, empirical data, 
and carefully considered intuitions concerning the nature of phenomenal 
consciousness, and move on by appeal to theoretical virtue” (271).
This project is built upon the “consciousness as a datum” thesis, and 
since science or Galilean metaphysics abolished consciousness in exchange 
for empirical progress, Goff concludes that there is no worry for metaphys-
ics not progressing because the true post-Galilean metaphysics has not yet 
begun (273).
It might be that his book is one of the fi rst ushering into the new era of 
phenomenally grounded metaphysics, but there are concerns that should be 
addressed. One concern comes from the idea that phenomenality should be 
thought of as metaphysically neutral, since there are examples that show 
how one phenomenal experience can support two different metaphysical sce-
narios. The other concern is at the very starting point of such a project and 
cuts at the heart of the contemporary dialectical setting of the mind-body 
discussion we mentioned earlier. What do we do with consciousness? Do we 
infl ate it and start phenomenally inspired metaphysics with it, or do we de-
fl ate it and proclaim its nature to be illusory? Since these positions diverge 
at the starting point, maybe the best thing to do is to let them run their 
course and see which one bears more theoretical fruit.
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